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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)0) (1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues of law are raised by defendant/appellant Lora Green as error 
in her appeal from the rulings and orders of the district court: 
1. Did the trial court commit error in denying Lora Green's motion for partial 
summary judgment that: (A) the Consent To Settle exclusion is unenforceable because it 
violated the underinsured motorist scheme mandated by statute in Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 31A-22-302 (l)(c) and 31A-22-305 (1) , (8), (9) and (10), as amended; and (B) under 
§ 31A-22-305(10)(c)(i) and the policy language, she is entitled to stack each of the 
underinsured motorist coverage policy limits contained in her two Utah insurance policies 
issued by State Farm? Review by this Court is under the correctness standard. Rushton v. 
Salt Lake County. 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.. 850 
P.2d 1272,1274 (Utah 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT: These issues were 
preserved at the trial court in Lora Green's Memorandum in Support of Her Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 20, 1999, R. 674-678; 684-690, her Reply 
Memorandum, filed on May 24, 1999, R. 924-946, in oral argument which occurred on 
November 1, 1999, R. 2876:24-31, and in Lora Green's Memorandum in Opposition to 
State Farm's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support of Green's 
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 28, 2000. R. 2271-2285. 
2. Did the trial court err in granting State Farm's motion for summary judgment, 
ruling that the Consent To Settle exclusion was enforceable, did not violate public policy 
and was not inconsistent with the statute-mandated underinsured motorist scheme under 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-302 (l)(c ) and 31A-22-305 (1), (8), (9) and (10), as amended? 
Review by this Court is under the correctness standard. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 
P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Racklev v. Fairview Care Ctrs., Inc., 970 P.2d 277, 280 
(Utah App. 1998). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was 
preserved at the trial court in Lora Green's Memorandum in Support of her Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 20, 1999, R. 674-678; 684-690, her Reply 
Memorandum filed on May 24, 1999, R. 924-946, her Memorandum in Opposition to 
State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on June 7, 1999, R. 1239-1256, in oral 
argument which occurred on November 1, 1999, R. 2876: 25-27, and in Lora Green's 
Memorandum in Opposition to State Farm's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 
and In Support of Green's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 28, 
2000. R. 2271-2285. 
3. Assuming the Consent To Settle exclusion is enforceable: 
a. Did the trial court commit error by ruling that the policy language 
regarding the Consent To Settle exclusion is not vague and ambiguous? Review by 
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this Court is under the correctness standard. Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 
P.2d 1272,1274 (Utah 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was 
preserved at the trial court in Lora Green's Memorandum in Support of Her Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 20, 1999, R. 678-683, in oral argument which 
occurred on November 1, 1999, R. 2876:30-31, and in Lora Green's Memorandum in 
Opposition to State Farm's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support of 
Green's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 28, 2000. R. 2271-2285. 
b. Did the trial court err by ruling as a matter of law that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether Lora Green's settlement 
with Marlene Murray impaired State Farm's rights of subrogation? Review by this 
Court is under the correctness standard. Mast v. Oversow 971 P.2d 928, 931 ^Utah 
App. 1998). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was 
preserved at the trial court in Lora Green's Memorandum in Opposition to State Farm's 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed on June 7, 1999, R. 1239-1256, in oral argument 
which occurred on November 1, 1999, R. 2876:27-30, and in Lora Green's Memorandum 
in Opposition to State Farm's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support of 
Green's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 28, 2000. R. 2271-2285. 
c. Did the trial court commit error by ruling as a matter of law that there 
was no genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether State Farm knew or 
should have known of the proposed settlement between Lora Green and Marlene 
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Murray and, whether State Farm acted reasonably in failing to give its written 
consent to the settlement? Review by this Court is under the correctness standard. 
Mast v. Overson. 971 P.2d 928. 931 (Utah App. 1998). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was 
preserved at the trial court in Lora Green's Memorandum in Opposition to State Farm's 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed on June 7, 1999, R. 1239-1256, in oral argument 
which occurred on November 1, 1999, R. 2876:25-30; 36-37, and in Lora Green's 
Memorandum in Opposition to State Farm's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 
and In Support of Green's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 28, 
2000. R. 2271-2285. 
cL: Did the trial court err by ruling as a matter of law that State Farm had 
not waived nor was otherwise estopped from asserting the Consent To Settle 
exclusion to deny underinsured motorist coverage to Lora Green? Review by this 
Court is under the correctness standard. Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 
App. 1998). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was 
preserved at the trial court in the Affidavit of L. Rich Humpherys filed on June 4, 1999, R. 
1064, at f 12, Lora Green's Memorandum in Opposition to State Farm's Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed on June 7, 1999, R. 1239-1256, in oral argument which 
occurred on November 1, 1999, R. 2876:37-38; 48-49, and in Lora Green's Memorandum 
in Opposition to State Farm's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support of 
Green's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 28, 2000. R. 2273-2276. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302 (l)(c). (Effective in July 1995) 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305. (Effective in July 1995) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
This is an action filed for declaratory relief by Plaintiff State Farm Automobile 
Mutual Insurance Company ("State Farm"), seeking a court ruling that Defendant Lora 
Green is not entitled to underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage in her two Utah policies 
of automobile insurance issued by State Farm. In each policy, the limit of State Farm's 
UIM coverage is $100,000 per person. State Farm claimed that a Consent To Settle 
exclusion contained in both policies excluded the UIM coverage for Mrs. Green. 
In April 1999, defendant Green filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
seeking, among other things, to have the Consent To Settle exclusion held unenforceable. 
R. 386; 673-697. In a Minute Entry dated June 7, 1999, the Court found that there were 
material issues of fact and denied Green's motion. R. 955-957. This ruling became a 
formal order on December 10, 1999. R. 1492-1493. See Addendum 1. 
In May 1999, plaintiff State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment. R. 899-
920. Defendant Green filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit to allow additional discovery before 
the court ruled on State Farm's motion for summary judgment. R. 1062-1068. The Court 
granted defendant Green's request for additional discovery on a limited basis, and denied 
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State Farm's motion for summary judgment without prejudice. R. 1523-1525. In March 
2000, defendant Green filed a motion to extend the scope of discovery, R. 1814-1836, 
which was denied except as it related to a very narrow inquiry of two witnesses. R. 
2874:92; 2875:3, 7-8, 11-13, 15-16. State Farm renewed its motion for summary 
judgment in May 2000, R. 1971-1988, which the Court granted in an order signed and 
entered on March 5, 2001. R. 2850-2855. See Addendum 2. State Farm's claims for 
declaratory relief against Marlene Murray were dismissed in February 2000, pursuant to 
stipulation. R. 1531-1534. 
Defendant/appellant Lora Green appeals both the denial of her motion for 
summary judgment and the granting of State Farm's motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves underinsured motorist (f,UIMff) coverage. State Farm filed a 
declaratory judgment action seeking to have the Court find that Lora Green was not entitled 
to UIM coverage under her two Utah policies issued by State Farm because of a Consent To 
Settle exclusion contained in the policies. 
On July 13, 1995, defendant/appellant Lora Green was a passenger in a car driven by 
Marlene Murray. Lloyd Louder was driving another vehicle in the opposite direction and 
collided head-on with the Murray vehicle. Lora Green sustained severe personal injuries. 
In October 1995, Lora Green filed a personal injury complaint against Lloyd Louder and 
Marlene Murray, but did not serve it on Mrs. Murray because of the pending policy limit 
offer and the subsequent settlement with Murray's liability insurer. 
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State Farm separately insured both Mrs. Green and Mr. Louder1 for their personal 
automobile insurance. R. 694-696. Marlene Murray was insured through Horace Mann 
Insurance Company with a liability policy limit of $25,000. R. 694; 605. State Farm had 
issued three (3) separate automobile insurance policies to Lora Green. One was a California 
policy which is not the subject of this action. The other two were Utah policies which 
provided UIM coverage with separate policy limits of $100,000 per person. R. 607-671; 
695-696. All of the above-mentioned policies were in full force and effect at the time of the 
accident. Horace Mann tendered its policy limit of $25,000 in the fall of 1995 to settle Mrs. 
Green's liability claims against Mrs. Murray. In February 1996, Mrs. Murray, through her 
insurer Horace Mann, settled with Lora Green for the policy limit of $25,000. 
Lora Green's Utah policies issued by State Farm contain an exclusion stating that 
there is no underinsured motorist coverage, 
FOR ANY INSURED WHO, WITHOUT OUR WRITTEN CONSENT. 
SETTLES WITH ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE 
LIABLE FOR THE BODILY INJURY AND THEREBY IMPAIRS THE 
RIGHT TO RECOVER OUR PAYMENTS. 
(R. 18) (Bold in original, underline added). See Addendum 3 for copy of State Farm's 
policy regarding UIM coverage. The above exclusion, often referred to as the Consent To 
Settle exclusion, formed the basis for State Farm's declaratory action herein. 
A day after the accident, July 14, 1995, and again on July 17, 1995, Tim Green, 
Lora's husband, gave notice to State Farm of the accident, the severity of his wife's injuries 
1
 State Farm, as Louder's liability carrier, claimed that Louder had no fault in the accident 
and refused to settle Mrs. Green's liability claim. Lora Green pursued her claim against 
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and the fact that Marlene Murray was underinsured. R. 1667-1674. On August 1, 1995, 
Jackson Howard, Lora Green's attorney, advised State Farm of Mrs. Green's UIM claim. 
R. 1663. At the time, State Farm neither accepted nor denied Mrs. Green's UIM claim and 
did nothing on the UIM claim until September 27, 1995, when it assigned an adjuster, 
Bonnie Markham, to handle Green's UIM claim. R. 1657-1659; 2881:13, 62 (Markham). 
State Farm also assigned JoAnn Hirase to handle Green's liability claim against Louder. R. 
2883:7 (Hirase). 
Contrary to representations made by State Farm to the trial court below, both 
adjusters shared information and had some involvement in the handling of the other's claim. 
R. 1723-1764; 1770, 1773, 1778; 1830-1833. For the first seven months, both adjusters 
were supervised by the same person, John Sacks, a State Farm supervisor in the Orem, Utah 
office. R. 2879:109 (Sacks). 
Lora Green's attorney sent a letter dated October 9, 1995, to State Farm 
documenting that her medical expenses and other special damages at that time exceeded 
$45,000 and that she suffered permanent debilitating injuries, R. 1790-1791; 514-597, 
which information was given to Bonnie Markham, State Farm's UIM adjuster. R. 1788; 
1790. By mid-October 1995, State Farm knew that Marlene Murray's $25,000 policy 
limit was insufficient to cover Lora Green's damages. Id.; R. 1775. Because State Farm 
claimed Louder had no fault, it knew or should have known that Mrs. Green would also 
have valid UIM claims based on Mrs. Murray's underinsurance. 
Louder to trial, resulting in a jury verdict in favor of Louder. The verdict was affirmed by 
this Court in July, 2001. See, Green v. Louden 29 P.3d 638 (Ut. 2001). 
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From Fall 1995 through February 1996, Lora Green's attorney Jackson Howard 
advised representatives of State Farm that Horace Mann was tendering its $25,000 policy 
limit and asked that State Farm quickly give its written consent to allow the settlement in 
order to relieve some of Mrs. Green's financial stress. R. 693-694; 486-512; 468. State 
Farm refused to give its consent, claiming that it needed to do an asset check on Mrs. 
Murray to evaluate its rights of subrogation. R. 1653; 510; 488-489; 467-482; 1739-
1764. 
After numerous unsuccessful attempts to obtain State Farm's written consent to 
settle, Jackson Howard called Bonnie Markham in January or early February 1996, and 
told her Mrs. Green needed to settle, whereupon he was told to go ahead. R. 693; 457-
482; 493-512. Lora Green, suffering from financial stress, then settled her claim against 
Murray for the $25,000 policy limit in February 1996. R. 452-455; 692-693. Thereafter, 
State Farm denied her UIM claims based on the exclusion that required its written 
consent to settle. 
Below, Lora Green filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a ruling 
that: (1) the Consent To Settle exclusion was unenforceable; and (2) the UIM policy 
limits of both her policies should be stacked for maximum coverage. R.673-697. The 
trial court denied her motion. See Addendum 1. State Farm also filed a motion for 
summary judgment, asserting that it was unaware that Horace Mann had tendered its 
policy limit to settle the claim against Mrs. Murray. Accordingly, it had no opportunity 
to consent to the settlement, and the Consent To Settle exclusion therefore precluded 
UIM coverage. R. 899-920. 
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The trial court eventually granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment and 
ruled that: (1) the Consent To Settle exclusion was enforceable; (2) State Farm was 
unaware before the settlement that Horace Mann had offered the $25,000 policy limit; (3) 
Lora Green had breached the insurance contract by settling with Marlene Murray without 
State Farm's written consent, and (4) therefore, Lora Green was not entitled to any UIM 
coverage. R. 2855-2850. See Addendum 2. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court should have granted Lora Green's motion for summary judgment and 
ruled that the Consent To Settle exclusion is unenforceable for two reasons. First, the Utah 
statutory law regarding UIM coverage neither provides for nor allows an insurer to add an 
exclusion that would limit the mandatory coverage. The exclusion violates the purpose of 
UIM coverage because it grants State Farm, in its sole discretion, the right to bestow, or not 
to bestow, the UIM coverage required by statute. Second, the exclusion violates public 
policy and is unconscionable. The UIM statute, the purpose of which is to protect innocent 
victims of automobile accidents, reflects public policy. Under the exclusion, State Farm can 
violate this public policy by imposing financial duress on the insured by withholding 
consent to the settlement and forcing the insured to continue litigating against the 
underinsured tort-feasor, thereby controlling the third-party claim, all with the sole purpose 
of protecting its own financial interest at the expense of its insured. 
The trial court should also have granted Green's motion for summary judgment to 
stack each of the two UIM limits contained in Green's State Farm policies. The UIM statute 
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specifically allows the stacking of UIM limits under certain circumstances which apply 
here, i.e., when an insured is injured while occupying a non-owned vehicle not regularly 
used by the insured or the insured's family. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(10)(c)(i). 
Furthermore, the State Farm policies do not preclude stacking. 
Assuming the exclusion is valid, Mrs. Green is still entitled to recover UIM benefits 
because the contract language precludes the application of the exclusion. The exclusion, 
which requires an impairment of State Farm's Right to Recover, does not apply because the 
facts of this case do not fall within State Farm's definition of "Right to Recover." At the 
very least, the contract language is ambiguous and accordingly should be interpreted to 
provide coverage. The principles of equitable subrogation do not apply because Mrs. Green 
has not been fully compensated and State Farm's position is not a superior equitable position 
to Mrs. Green who has paid a premium for UIM coverage and remains grossly 
uncompensated. 
If the exclusion is enforceable, State Farm must act reasonably in applying its right to 
consent to the settlement. There are numerous issues of fact regarding this issue including: 
(1) did State Farm know or it should have known of the pending settlement; (2) did State 
Farm's dilatory and other unreasonable actions result in the failure to timely consent to the 
settlement; and (3) was State Farm's subrogation right "impaired", i.e., did Mrs. Green's 
damages exceed the amount of the settlement plus the collectable assets of Mrs. Murray? 
These issues preclude summary judgment in favor of State Farm. 
Finally, in light of State Farm's lack of investigation and other unreasonable actions, 
State Farm should be estopped from enforcing the exclusion. State Farm's failure to do 
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anything during most of the eight-month period prior to the settlement, together with its 
statement to Mrs. Green's attorney to proceed with settlement, constitute a legal waiver, or, 
at the very least, a question of fact to be determined by the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED LORA GREEN'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The trial court should have held that the Consent To Settle exclusion was 
unenforceable and that the two UIM policy limits of $100,000 should be stacked for 
purposes of providing coverage to Lora Green. 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Hold the "Consent To Settle" 
Exclusion Unenforceable. 
The trial court determined as a matter of law that State Farm's Consent To Settle 
exclusion, which required State Farmfs prior written consent to any settlement with the 
tort-feasor before UIM coverage would apply, was valid and enforceable. The trial court 
erred in this holding because (1) the Utah statute mandates underinsured motorist 
coverage and does not permit such an exclusion; and (2) Utah public policy precludes 
State Farm from asserting such exclusion to a statutorily mandated coverage. 
1. Under Utah's Insurance Code, UIM Coverage is 
Mandatory and May Not Be Limited By a Consent To 
Settle Exclusion. 
In interpreting a statute, the court's "primary goal is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Lieber v. 
ITT Hartford Ins. Center. Inc., 15 P.3d 1030, 1034 (Utah 2000) (citation omitted). The 
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purpose of UIM coverage has been expressly stated by this court in U.S. Fidelity and 
Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519 (Ut. 1993): 
Underinsured motorist coverage provides first-party insurance protection 
for damages that exceed the limits of the tort-feasor's bodily injury 
coverage. Underinsured motorist coverage is a facet of uninsured motorist 
coverage; its purpose is to provide insurance protection to the insured 
against damages caused by a negligent motorist as if the motorist had 
another liability policy in the amount of the underinsured policy. 
* * * 
Since 1921 this Court has expressed its commitment to the principle that 
"insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and 
their beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of 
insurance. 
Id. at 521 (citations omitted). 
Section 31 A-22-302( 1) of the Utah Insurance Code states: 
Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy 
the owner's or operator's security requirement... shall include: 
* * * 
(c) underinsured motorist coverage under § 31A-22-305, unless 
affirmatively waived . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). See Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-302 and 31A-22-305, attached as 
Addendum 4 and 5 respectively. 
A policy issued by State Farm in Utah must comply with this mandated coverage. 
Any provision of the policy which is inconsistent with or in violation of the statute, is 
void. See, e ^ , Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call 712 P.2d 231, 233-4 (Utah 1985) (although 
2
 All references to §§ 31A-22-302 and -305 of the Utah Code, are the sections effective 
on July 13, 1995, the day of the accident. 
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insurer may contract with insured as to risks it will or will not assume, insurer may not 
violate statutory law or public policy). 
Though the Utah Insurance Code expressly allows a carrier to provide greater 
coverage than required by the statute3, the Code is bereft of any provision allowing an 
insurer to provide coverages more restrictive than those provided by statute Case law is 
clearly aligned with this concept. Farmers Ins. Exch.. supra, at 233-235. 
One of the expressed purposes of the Utah Insurance Code is to "ensure that 
policyholders...are treated fairly and equitably." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-102(2); see 
also. Tanner v. Phoenix Ins.Co.. 799 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah App. 1990). The provisions of 
the insurance code are to be liberally construed, in order to afford the maximum amount 
of required insurance coverage to an insured. Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co.. 
963 P.2d 788, 795 (Utah App. 1998) ("Statutes pertaining to representations in insurance 
contracts 'are to be liberally construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured.'" 
(citations omitted)). 
The statute requires that UIM benefits be paid to an insured if the tort-feasor is 
underinsured, as defined by Section 31 A-22-305(8)(a), which states: 
As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a vehicle, 
the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a liability 
policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has 
insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all 
special and general damages. 
See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303(l)(b), which provides that a policy may 
provide terms more favorable to insureds than the statute requires. Section 31A-22-
303(2)(a) provides that an insurer affording liability insurance may grant coverage in 
addition to statutorily required minimum insurance. 
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Significantly, nowhere does the statute give the right or condition an insurer's duty 
to provide UIM coverage upon the insured's compliance with a Consent To Settle 
requirement imposed by the UIM insurer. The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that "omissions in statutory language should be taken note of and given effect." Lieber, 
supra, 15 P.3d at 1035 (citing Biddle v. Washington Terrace City. 993 P.2d 875, 879 
(Utah 1999)). The operative language that triggers coverage in the statute is, "... a 
vehicle ... which has insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party 
..." Considerations, such as protecting the insurer's right of subrogation and the financial 
worth of the underinsured motorist, are never mentioned and would represent an 
inconsistent restriction of the mandated coverage. 
Furthermore, the statute does not allow a UIM carrier to withhold or deny its 
payment until such time as it verifies an underinsured tort-feasor's ability to financially 
respond to subrogation. In fact, the statute does not provide any subrogation right4. To 
the contrary, the Utah statute provides that 
Underinsured motorist coverage may not be set off against the liability 
coverage of the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but 
shall be added to, combined with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of 
the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle to determine the 
limit of coverage available to the injured person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b) (emphasis added).5 
4
 If there is an equitable right of subrogation, it cannot form the basis of restricting, 
withholding, or delaying benefits required to be paid by statute. See Argument III. 
below. 
5
 This language is currently codified in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(e), and is 
substantively identical to the 1995 statute. 
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State Farm's exclusion is wholly inconsistent with this language. The statute does 
not allow State Farm to condition payment of mandatory UIM benefits upon its 
discretionary bestowal of written permission, nor upon its completion of an "asset check" 
of Mrs. Murray, nor upon Mrs. Murray's ability to respond to a subrogation claim. To 
the contrary, § 31A-22-305(9)(b) specifically provides that UIM benefits are secondary 
only to "the liability coverage of an owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle," 
not the liability coverage plus the underinsured motorist's personal assets as well. 
Once it has been established that the tort-feasor has "insufficient liability coverage 
to compensate fully the injured party," there is nothing in the Utah statute or case law that 
would permit a Consent To Settle exclusion. The statute is straightforward and simple. 
The Utah policies issued to Mrs. Green must comply with Utah law. Accordingly, this 
restrictive exclusion is void and the trial court should have granted Mrs. Green's motion 
for summary judgment on this issue. 
2. The "Consent To Settle" Exclusion Violates Utah Public Policy 
and is Unconscionable. 
As stated above, one of the insurance code's expressed purposes is to ensure that 
policyholders are treated fairly and equitably. Furthermore, this Court has explicitly 
recognized that an insurer's freedom to contract with an insured is necessarily limited by 
public policy considerations. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call supra, 712 P.2d at 233. To be 
enforceable, exclusions or limitations contained in an insurance policy must not violate 
either statute or public policy. Id. 
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Statutorily mandated coverages reflect Utah's public policy of protecting innocent 
victims of automobile accidents. Id. at 234. See also, generally, Berube v. Fashion 
Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1042-1043 (Utah 1989) (Public policy is "that principle of 
law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious 
to the public, or against the public good." Public policy is embodied in legislative 
enactments which "protect the public or promote public interest."). Thus, public policy 
precludes an insurer from placing conditions, restrictions, or exclusions on mandatory 
coverages that are more stringent than those provided in the code. 
It is also the long-settled public policy in Utah that actions between victims and 
tort-feasors be settled or resolved as expeditiously as possible, without resort to 
unnecessary litigation. See Fenton v. Salt Lake County. 4 Utah 466 (Utah Terr. 1886) 
(judicious public policy avoids unnecessary litigation and expenditure of costs); 
Scarborough v. Granite School District. 531 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah 1975). In addition, 
public policy requires that an insurer give its insured's interests at least as much 
consideration as it gives its own. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 840 P.2d 
130, 137-138 (Utah App. 1992). Insurers' attempts to enforce exclusionary clauses based 
on their asserted fear of collusion have been held as insufficient to overcome public 
policy protecting such innocent victims, and have been rejected by this Court.6 Id. at 
236. 
6
 Although Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call involved a household exclusion clause in an auto 
policy, the court's rejection of the collusion argument is especially noteworthy in the 
instant case, where State Farm has repeatedly asserted the risk of collusion as a basis for 
the Consent To Settle exclusion. R. 2292; 1976. 
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State Farm's Consent To Settle exclusion violates Utah public policy because such 
exclusion allows State Farm to determine in its discretion when and if its insured can 
settle with an underinsured tort-feasor, thus potentially forcing financial duress on its 
insured to keep litigating or to accept a lesser settlement. Such exclusion is inherently 
inconsistent with the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. Beck v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch.. 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). Moreover, "courts endeavor to construe 
contracts so as not to grant one of the parties an absolute and arbitrary right to terminate a 
contract." Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 
1037 (Utah 1985). The unjust result of such an exclusion is precisely that; i.e., State 
Farm is given the absolute and arbitrary right to terminate a provision in Mrs. Green's 
policy. 
Furthermore, the exclusion would allow State Farm to effectively control the 
settlement with the underinsured tort-feasor, even though it is not a party to the action. 
State Farm would have the power to force its insured to continue litigating against an 
underinsured tort-feasor who may be willing to settle for policy limits, all in the name of 
protecting State Farm's "right of subrogation", i.e., State Farm's financial interest, at the 
direct expense of its insured. Issues involving UIM coverage usually arise when the 
insured has suffered substantial injury and loss. Public policy favors an insured's 
interests in resolving the case as quickly as possible. Medical providers, family members 
and others may be dependent upon the financial resolution of the case. State Farm's 
exclusion runs counter to all of these considerations. 
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A primary purpose of insurance is to provide financial security to an insured, not 
to protect the insurer's financial interests. State Farm has already been compensated for 
the coverage through premiums paid. An insured should be provided all benefits for 
which the insured has paid, and an insurer should act quickly and equitably to resolve its 
insured's claims. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exctu 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985); Campbell 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 137 (Utah App. 1992). The only 
justification and purpose of such exclusion would be to protect State Farm's financial 
interests. In fact, the exclusion encourages an insurer to place its own interests above 
those of its insured. There is nothing about the exclusion which protects the insured. 
Such is without question a violation of public policy and cannot be allowed. 
Furthermore, the exclusion must also fail under the doctrine of unconscionability. 
Though this equitable doctrine is largely undeveloped in Utah, this Court expressly 
acknowledged this doctrine in Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 839 
P.2d 798, 805-07 and n.13 (Utah 1992), and suggested the doctrine may be used as a 
means to address inequitable results in the field of insurance. 
Because Utah public policy and the doctrine of unconscionability would not allow 
State Farm to impose a Consent To Settle exclusion, the denial of Greenfs motion for 
summary judgment was error. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Hold That Green Is 
Entitled To Stack Each of the UIM Policy Limits Contained in 
Her Two Utah Insurance Policies. 
Green submits that because the Consent To Settle clause is unenforceable as a 
matter of law, the trial court further erred in failing to grant Green's motion for summary 
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judgment that Green is entitled to stack the policy limits of her two State Farm policies in 
determining the amount of available UIM coverage. Lora Green paid State Farm two 
separate premiums for each of her Utah policies. Each policy contains a UIM coverage 
limit of $100,000 per person. Under the UIM statute, these policy limits may be stacked 
so that the total UIM coverage available to Mrs. Green is $200,000. 
The Utah statute provides a qualified prohibition against stacking UIM limits for 
two or more vehicles in a policy of insurance. It states: 
The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or more 
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to 
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for 
any one accident. 
Section 31A-22-305(10)(b)(i), see Addendum 5. Subsection (b)(ii), however, expressly 
states an exception to the above prohibition to stacking: 
Subsection (b)(i) applies to all persons except a covered person as defined 
under Subsection (c)(i)(B). 
Section 31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B) provides for stacking of UIM policy limits 
where, as applies here, the person who is making a UIM claim is injured in an unowned 
vehicle, or a vehicle which is not available for the person's regular use or the regular use 
of the person's spouse or resident relative. The operative language states: 
(i) Each of the following persons may also recover underinsured 
motorist coverage benefits under any other policy in which 
they are described as a "covered person" as defined under 
Subsection (1): 
* * * 
(B) a covered person injured while occupying or using a 
motor vehicle that is not owned by, furnished, or available for 
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the regular use of the covered person, the covered person's 
resident spouse, or the covered person's resident relative. 
Section 31 A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B) (emphasis added). 
Under the facts of this case, Lora Green was a "covered person" as defined in 
Section 31A-22-305(l) and (10)(c)(i)(B), and is therefore entitled to stack the UIM 
coverage limits of all the policies she purchased that provided such coverage to her. It is 
undisputed that the automobile in which Mrs. Green was injured was neither owned by 
her, nor furnished or available for her regular use or the regular use of her spouse or other 
relative living with her. Mrs. Green was a passenger in an automobile owned by her 
mother, Marlene Murray, who did not reside with Mrs. Green. R. 699-701. 
In the case of USF&G v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme 
Court has acknowledged the legislative intent to provide stacking in these circumstances. 
Though the case addressed a different issue regarding UIM coverage, the court quoted 
Senator Reese's statement contained in the legislative history: 
HB14 [UIM statute] states that all underinsurance must be stacked on the 
underinsured motorist's existing coverage always guaranteeing that the 
consumer is buying protection through his or her purchase. 
Id. at 526 (emphasis added). Consistent with the plain language of the statute and the 
legislative intent behind the statute, Mrs. Green is entitled to stack the policy limits of her 
two policies. 
State Farm erroneously argued below that such stacking is eliminated by 
Subsection 10(c)(iii), which states: 
A covered person as defined under Subsection (c)(i)(B) is entitled to the 
highest limits of underinsured motorist coverage afforded for any one 
21 
vehicle that the covered person is the named insured or an insured family 
member. 
Given the express language allowing stacking in 10(c)(i), State Farm's interpretation 
simply makes no sense. Subsection 10(c)(iii) clearly applies only to a situation in which 
a "covered person" has more than one automobile covered under the same policy rather 
than a "covered person" who has different policies covering different automobiles. State 
Farm's interpretation makes the statute inherently inconsistent, and accordingly, must be 
rejected. Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Center. Inc.. 15 P.3d 1030, 1034 (Utah 2000). In 
the instant case, Green paid separate premiums for UIM coverage on two separate Utah 
policies. Under the clear mandates of the statute, such coverages can be stacked. 
Even if the statute were silent on the matter, State Farm's policy language does not 
preclude stacking of UIM limits from separate policies purchased by the insured. See 
section of State Farm's policy entitled, "If There Is Other Underinsured Motor Vehicle 
Coverage," Addendum 3, R. 17. 
II. EVEN ASSUMING THE "CONSENT TO SETTLE" CLAUSE IS VALID, 
MRS. GREEN IS LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RECOVER UIM BENEFITS 
BASED ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATE FARM POLICIES. 
A. Standard for Interpreting Insurance Policies. 
An insured is entitled to the broadest protection reasonably understood to be 
provided by an insurance contract. Fuller v. Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 
(Utah 1985). Ambiguities in an insurance policy are to be construed against the insurer, 
and in favor of coverage. L.D.S. Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 
(Utah 1988) (citations omitted); Fuller, supra at 1046. If a term is susceptible to different 
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interpretations which are equally plausible, the term is ambiguous, and should be 
construed in favor of coverage. L.D.S. Hospital at 860-61. 
In determining whether a word or phrase in an insurance contract is ambiguous, a 
court considers whether the language in the policy 
would . . . be plain to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, 
viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance with the usual and 
natural meaning of the words in light of the existing circumstances, 
including the purpose of the policy. 
Id. at 858-59 (emphasis added); Draughon v. CUNA Mutual Insurance Society. 771 P.2d 
1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989). Accordingly, terms used in an insurance policy must be 
given their usual and ordinary meaning. See also Bergera v. Ideal National Life 
Insurance Co., 524 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1974). The Utah Supreme Court has rejected an 
insurer's argument that words in an insurance policy should be afforded an unusual 
meaning. Mason v. Commercial Union Assurance Companies. 626 P.2d 428, 429 (Utah 
1981). 
B. State Farm's Own Policy Language Supports Summary Judgment in 
Mrs, Green's Favor, 
The applicable language of State Farm's policies states: 
THERE IS NO [UIM] COVERAGE: 
1. FOR ANY INSURED WHO, WITHOUT OUR WRITTEN 
CONSENT, SETTLES WITH ANY PERSON OR 
ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE LIABLE FOR THE 
BODILY INJURY ANT) THEREBY IMPAIRS OUR RIGHT 
TO RECOVER OUR PAYMENTS. 
23 
R. 18 (bold in original, underline added). See Addendum 3. Assuming its validity, the 
above exclusion applies only if State Farm's "Right to Recover [its] Payments" is 
impaired. 
An insurer's right to recover the benefits it has paid its insured is encompassed 
within the principle of subrogation, which finds its foundation either in contract or in 
equity. Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864, 866 (Utah 1988). 
Contractual subrogation is strictly construed based on the language of the contract. Id. 
Non-contractual subrogation is based on equitable principles as set forth in case law. 
State Farm's "Right to Recover our payments" is specifically defined in the 
section of the policy entitled "Conditions" which states: 
3. Our Right to Recover Our Payments 
* * * 
d. Under underinsured motor vehicle coverage: 
(1) we are entitled, to the extent of our payments, to the 
proceeds of any settlement the insured recovers from 
any party liable for the bodily injury, other than 
payments from bodily injury liability bonds or policies 
made prior to our payment. 
(2) if the insured has not been fully compensated for the 
bodily injury by the party at fault and we make 
payment for the bodily injury,the insured shall: 
(a) keep these rights in trust for us; 
(b) execute any legal papers we need; and 
(c) when we ask, take action through our 
representative to recover the amount of our 
payments. 
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We are to be repaid our payments, costs and fees of 
collection out of any such recovery. 
R. 11 (bold in original). See Addendum 6. 
Based on State Farm's own language, State Farm's Right to Recover could only 
apply to amounts that the underinsured motorist has paid, over and above the limits of the 
liability policy. For example, presume that State Farm had paid $100,000 on its UIM 
coverage and that instead of paying only the $25,000 policy limit of her Horace Mann 
insurance policy, Mrs. Murray had personally paid an additional $10,000 cash to settle 
the claim. Mrs. Green would then have received a total of $135,000, of which $10,000 
would not be insurance money. The above language would allow State Farm to argue 
that it has a right to recover the $10,000 of "personal payment" made by Mrs. Murray 
(assuming Mrs. Green's total damages are $125,000). 
What is confusing, however, is the language of subparagraph (1) above, "to the 
extent of our payments", which implies that State Farm has made UIM payments before 
the settlement, but it then excludes from its Right to Recover the amount of liability 
insurance paid "prior to our payment" (emphasis added). This makes little sense because 
the liability insurer would not pay its liability limits without a settlement of claims 
against its insured. Thus, State Farm's Right To Recover seems to apply only to: (1) a 
tort-feasor, other than the underinsured motorist who may be at fault and who settles after 
State Farm has made UIM payments, or (2) a prior settlement with the underinsured for 
an amount more than the underinsured's liability policy limit. 
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State Farm provides in its policy that it is entitled "to the proceeds of any 
settlement the insured recovers from any party liable for the bodily injury..." However, 
State Farm clearly limits such recovery to proceeds which are obtained through 
settlement which are "other than payments from bodily injury liability bonds or policies 
made prior to our payment." (Emphasis added). By law, the UIM benefits are in addition 
to the liability limits. Accordingly, State Farm cannot subrogate against the liability 
limits whether they are paid before or after the UIM benefits are paid. Obviously, 
Subparagraph 3.d.(l) is unclear and ambiguous. 
It is further important to note that under subparagraph 3.d. above, State Farm's 
"Right To Recover [its] Payments" does not arise until after State Farm has actually paid 
its UIM benefits. Both subsections d.(l) and (2) state clearly that State Farm's Right to 
Recover applies to payments actually made, not to payments that will be made: 
(1) we are entitled, to the extent of our payments, to the proceeds of any 
settlement.... 
(2) if the insured has not been fully compensated for the bodily injury 
by the party at fault and we make payment for the bodily injury, the 
insured shal l . . . [safeguard State Farm's "rights"]. 
R. 11 (underline added). 
Based on State Farm's own definition of Our Right to Recover Our Payment, it 
had no such right at the time Mrs. Green settled with Horace Mann for three reasons: (1) 
there was no recovery above Horace Mann's policy limit; (2) Mrs. Green was not fully 
compensated; and (3) State Farm had not paid Mrs. Green any benefits. Any one of 
these three uncontested facts defeats a claim that State Farm had a Right to Recover. The 
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policy conditions the application of the Consent To Settle exclusion on the impairment of 
"our right to recover our payments," not "our potential right" or "right to recover our 
future payments." Accordingly, by State Farm's own definition, there was no Right To 
Recover, and the exclusion therefore does not apply. Mrs. Green had no duty to obtain 
State Farm's written permission to settle since State Farm's purported Right to Recover 
did not exist at that time. At the very least, State Farm's policy language is ambiguous, 
and must be construed strictly against State Farm, the drafter of the adhesive contract. 
III. EQUITABLE SUBROGATION DOES NOT PROVIDE A BASIS TO 
SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
As discussed above, State Farm's contractual Right To Recover, is premised on a 
strict interpretation of the policy language. The court below, however, seemed to focus 
only on the impairment of State Farm's future right to recover its UIM payments from 
Mrs. Murray's personal assets. Since the policy did not address the impairment of State 
Farm's future right to recover, the only basis for considering such impairment must be 
based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the underlying principles that apply to the 
doctrine of equitable subrogation in the case of Educators Mutual Insurance Assoc, v. 
Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Co.. 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995). In that case, the 
court summarized these basic principles: 
Subrogation is an equitable doctrine that allows a person or entity which 
pays the loss or satisfies the claim of another under a legally cognizable 
Since State Farm had made no UIM payments, it had no present right to recover 
anythug. 
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obligation or interest to step into the shoes of the other person and assert 
that person's rights.. . . Three equitable reasons are traditionally advanced 
for permitting subrogation: 
(1) that the person who in good faith pays the debt or obligation of 
another has equitably purchased (quasi-contractually), or is at least entitled 
to, the obligation owed by the debtor or tort-feasor; (2) that the wrongdoer 
(tortfeasor) is not entitled to a windfall release from his obligation simply 
because the injured party had the foresight to obtain insurance; and (3) 
that public policy is served by allowing insurers to recover and thus reduce 
insurance rates generally. 
However, "subrogation is not a matter of right but may be invoked only in 
those circumstances where justice demands its application, and the rights of 
the one seeking subrogation have a greater equity than the one who opposes 
him." Subrogation is not permitted where it will work any injustice to 
others." 
IcL at 1030-1031 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
This Court further developed the equitable principles that apply to subrogation in 
Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988): 
Subrogation is an equitable doctrine and is governed by equitable 
principles. This doctrine can be modified by contract, but in the absence of 
express terms to the contrary, the insured must be made whole before the 
insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from a recovery from the third-party 
tort-feasor. Noncontractual subrogation rights will only be enforced on 
behalf of a party maintaining a superior equitable position, and the insurer's 
equitable position cannot be superior to the insured's unless the insured has 
been completely compensated. 
Id. at 866.8 
Based on the above principles, the trial court's ruling cannot be sustained . The 
first reason for allowing subrogation (insurer pays the debt) does not apply, since State 
8
 It is interesting to note that in Hill though it was not involving UIM benefits, State 
Farm was denied its right to recover its payments because the settlement was insufficient 
to fully compensate the injured parties. 
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Farm has not made any payment of benefits. It is undisputed that Mrs. Green has 
received no double recovery or windfall. The $25,000 settlement has not made her 
whole. Likewise, equity is against State Farm on this issue, as described in Point LB. 
above. Further, equitable subrogation is invoked only "on behalf of a party maintaining a 
superior equitable position, and the insureds equitable position cannot be superior to the 
insured's unless the insured has been completely compensated." Id. 
Clearly, State Farm, having received a premium for UIM coverage, cannot claim 
under these circumstances that equity demands a denial of UIM benefits. On the 
contrary, Mrs. Green's uncompensated damages are compelling. State Farm's refusal to 
pay benefits works an injustice on her and others who are impacted through Green's 
financial situation. 
IV. ASSUMING THE VALIDITY OF THE EXCLUSION, THERE REMAIN 
FACTUAL ISSUES WHICH SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
The trial court failed to address a number of factual issues which should have 
precluded summary judgment, as addressed below. 
A. IF GREEN'S DAMAGES EXCEED MURRAY'S 
COLLECTABLE ASSETS, STATE FARM'S RIGHT TO 
RECOVERY ISN'T IMPAIRED IN ANY EVENT. 
If the Consent To Settle exclusion applies, the court must determine whether State 
Farm's Right To Recover was "impaired." In order to make this determination, several 
specific factual findings must be made, which include: (1) what are Green's total 
damages; (2) what is the total "collectible" amount of Mrs. Murray's assets (excluding 
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Mr. Murray's interest therein); and (3) do Green's damages exceed the amount of 
Murray's collectible assets. If Green's damages exceed any collectible assets of Murray, 
State Farm's Right To Recover would not be "impaired", since Green, not State Farm, 
would be entitled to recover Murray's assets. State Farm's Right To Recover would not 
apply until Green has been fully compensated. 
To determine the factual issue of whether State Farm was impaired, the 
assumption must be made that State Farm would not consent to the settlement. If State 
Farm would have consented to the settlement, State Farm's position is moot. If it refused 
to consent, Green would have been required to pursue her claim against Murray to a 
judgment, at which time Horace Mann would then pay the policy limit of $25,000. 
Thereafter, Green would be entitled to recover any excess judgment from the collectible 
assets of Murray. If her judgment exceeded the amount of all collectible assets, Green 
would still have a UIM claim against State Farm for the balance of her uncollected 
damages. Therefore, State Farm's Right to Recover could not, by definition, be 
"impaired", and the exclusion would not apply. Even assuming State Farm's position is 
valid on all other points, the issue of whether State Farm's Right to Recovery has been 
impaired is an ultimate issue of fact which should have precluded summary judgment. 
B. Material Fact Questions Exist Regarding Whether State Farm 
Knew or Should Have Known of Green's Proposed Settlement 
with Marlene Murray, and If So. Whether State Farm Acted 
Reasonably in Failing to Give its Written Consent to the 
Settlement 
The trial court acknowledged that State Farm had an implied duty to act 
reasonably in giving or not giving written consent to settle, R. 1524-1525, 
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however, it found that State Farm had not received actual notice of the proposed 
settlement. Accordingly, State Farm could not have acted unreasonably as a 
matter of law. The trial court's grant of summary judgment on this issue was error 
because material fact questions existed with regard to whether State Farm knew or 
should have known of Mrs. Green's proposed settlement with Mrs. Murray, and 
whether State Farm acted reasonably in withholding its consent. If anything, the 
facts favor Mrs. Green on this issue. Regardless, however, summary judgment 
was not appropriate. 
The accident occurred on July 13, 1995. The undisputed facts show that State 
Farm was on notice of the accident and the possible UIM claim by July 14, 1995. R. 
1674. State Farm expressly noted in its claim file on July 17, 1995 (three days after the 
accident) that this case involved an underinsured motorist and Mrs. Green had sustained 
"major injuries." R. 1674. It had sufficient information at that time to investigate a UIM 
claim. Instead of promptly investigating, it closed its file on July 21, 1995. R. 1665-
1672. Even after Mr. Howard had given formal notice of a UIM claim in his letter of 
August 1, 1995, State Farm did not open a UIM file until September 27, 1995. R. 1784-
1788. By mid-October, State Farm was aware that Green's medical expenses exceeded 
$40,000, not to mention her lost income from her job as a biochemist. R. 1790-1791. 
Though Mr. Howard had advised State Farm in August that the Horace Mann policy limit 
was $25,000, by early October State Farm independently verified the limit directly with 
Horace Mann. R. 1775, 1788. Shortly after the accident, State Farm had taken the 
position that Murray/Horace Mann was the only liable party. The reality of a UIM claim 
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against State Farm was obvious at least by October, and would have been obvious before 
October if State Farm had fulfilled its duty to promptly investigate after receiving Green's 
initial notice. 
The facts that support Green's position that State Farm knew or should have 
known of the pending settlement with Horace Mann are as follows: 
a. The adjusters testified that there was no need to do an asset search on the 
underinsured motorist until there was a viable UIM claim, i.e., the liability carrier has 
tendered its limits. R. 2881:42 (Markham). On October 31, 1995, State Farm assigned 
attorney Ivie9 to perform the asset search on Murray. R. 1725-1764. Ivie did not follow 
through with the assignment and on January 4, 1996, he admitted to Markham that he had 
not yet performed the search. Id. State Farm then retained a third party investigator. Id. 
The UIM claim file shows no activity by State Farm from July 21 through September 27, 
and from November 8 until January 4. 
b. Jackson Howard filed the law suit against Murray and Louder in October 
1995, but only served Louder.10 It would be obvious to Mr. Ivie and State Farm that, 
given the liability of Murray and high damages of Green, a settlement offer for the policy 
limits of only $25,000 would be made. This was even acknowledged by superintendent 
Sacks in his notes dated November 8, 1995, wherein he gave directions to Markham as 
Attorney Ray Phillips Ivie, who is regularly retained as State Farm's defense counsel, 
was retained by State Farm to defend Lloyd Louder in Mrs. Greenfs third party claim. In 
spite of this, State Farm also used Mr. Ivie to represent State Farm against Mrs. Green in 
her UIM claim, which appears to be a conflict of interest given the duties of good faith 
owed by State Farm to Mrs. Green in her UIM claim. 
32 
follows, "Coordinate with Hirase concerning when [not "if] payment of limits occurs..." 
R. 1723 (emphasis added). This clearly indicates that State Farm was shortly anticipating 
the payment of limits by Horace Mann. There would be no mystery about the anticipated 
settlement to an insurance company that would promptly and diligently investigate the 
matter, rather than sit on the sidelines waiting to see what happened. 
c. The trial court seemed to disregard the testimony of Jackson Howard that 
by the fall of 1995, he had given State Farm notice of the policy limit offer by Horace 
Mann, because Howard could not specifically recall the exact times and people he talked 
to at State Farm and because the State Farm people, who also admitted that they did not 
have specific recollection outside of their file notes, had no record of such 
communication. If Mr. Howard had not been trying to get State Farm's consent to the 
settlement, why would he wait until February 1996 to settle when Horace Mann was 
tendering its $25,000 limit months before? Why would Jackson Howard not have served 
Mrs. Murray with the complaint if Horace Mann had not offered its $25,000 limit? Why 
did State Farm request an asset search on October 31, 1995? Why would State Farm 
superintendent Sacks direct Markham on November 8, 1995, to "Coordinate with Hirase 
concerning when payment of limits occurs"? The evidence is consistent with Jackson 
Howard's testimony that he tried to obtain State Farm's consent in the fall of 1995, but 
State Farm was simply dilatory thereby forcing Green to eventually settle in February 
1996, due to financial duress. 
Louder was served in October 1995. 
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On November 6, 1995, State Farm adjuster Bonnie Markham sent Mr. Howard a 
letter which noted that State Farm at that time required verification of Horace Mann 
policy limit (even though Markham had already verified the limits directly with Horace 
Mann, R.1775), and that State Farm would need to do an assets check on Mrs. Murray 
before any UIM claim could be considered. R. 1653. 
Green submits that with the knowledge that State Farm had in the fall of 1995, it is 
completely disingenuous to assert that it lacked notice of the proposed $25,000 policy 
limit settlement. It was therefore unreasonable for State Farm to fail to give prompt 
consent to Green and further unreasonable delay and then to deny UIM benefits based on 
the lack of State Farm's consent. Again, these are clearly issues of material fact for the 
jury. 
V. STATE FARM WAIVED AND/OR WAS OTHERWISE ESTOPPED 
FROM ASSERTING THE "CONSENT TO SETTLE" EXCLUSION. 
In light of State Farm's delay and failure to dutifully investigate and perform its 
obligations under Mrs. Green's insurance policies, State Farm waived or is otherwise 
estopped from asserting the Consent To Settle exclusion as a defense to Mrs. Green's 
coverage. If State Farm can require written consent, it cannot unreasonably withhold it, 
as it did with Mrs. Green. 
As discussed previously, an insured must be provided all coverages for which the 
insured has paid. The insurer must act promptly and equitably to resolve its insured's 
claims. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); Campbell v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1992). 
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State Farm had more than enough time to investigate the UIM claim. From 
July 17, 1995, when it first noted the possible UIM claim, to the settlement in February 
1996, State Farm could have easily verified all of the facts necessary to extend coverage. 
Instead, State Farm chose to close its files, wait more than two months to open the UIM 
file, and then do little or nothing over the next four and one-half months to independently 
obtain any needed information. State Farm cannot take this approach without waiving its 
rights (if any) to enforce the Consent To Settle provision. Waiver would apply to a 
company that sits back, does not fulfill its duties and delays addressing the consent to 
settle. See, e.g., Lambert v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 576 So.2d 160 (Ala. 
1991). See also Soter's v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 
(Utah 1993) (noting that where there is a duty or obligation to speak, failing to speak may 
constitute waiver). 
State Farm further waived its right to enforce the Consent To Settle exclusion 
when a State Farm adjuster implicitly consented to the settlement when she told Green's 
attorney Jackson Howard to go ahead and "do what you have to do" concerning settling 
with Mrs. Murray. R. 693, 457-482; 493-512. Soter's. 857 P.2d at 940. (A distinct 
intention to relinquish a known right constitutes waiver). In Soter's. the Utah Supreme 
Court clarified that the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct, although it may be 
express or implied. Id. at 940. Under this legal standard, "a fact finder need only 
determine whether the totality of the circumstances 'warrants the inference of 
relinquishment.5" Id. at 942 (citation omitted). 
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Under the totality of circumstances in the instant case, there are questions of fact 
as to whether by its words and inaction State Farm waived its right to enforce the Consent 
To Settle exclusion. This is consistent with one of the cases previously relied on by State 
Farm during the summary judgment proceedings, State Farm v. Blanco, 617 N.Y.S.2d 
898 (A.D. 1994). In that case, the court stated that if the "insured can demonstrate that 
the insurer, either by its conduct, silence, or unreasonable delay, waived the requirement 
of consent or acquiesced in the settlement," the exclusion does not apply. Id at 899. In 
the instant case, State Farm's conduct and unreasonable delay in handling Mrs. Green's 
claim would warrant a finding of waiver or would otherwise estop State Farm from 
enforcing the written consent requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's declaratory judgment in favor of State Farm should be reversed and 
remanded with directions that summary judgment should be entered in favor of Mrs. Green. 
The Court should hold the Consent To Settle exclusion unenforceable and that Mrs. Green's 
two UIM policy limits of $100,000 each may be stacked for purposes of determining her 
UIM coverage. 
In the alternative, assuming the Consent To Settle exclusion is enforceable, the Court 
should find that the applicable policy language is vague and ambiguous or that State Farm 
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has waived or is estopped from enforcing the exclusion. Accordingly, the Court should 
construe that Mrs. Green is entitled to UIM coverage. At the very least, the Court should 
hold there are genuine issues of material of fact for trial. Summary judgment should 
therefore be reversed. 
DATED this / / c t ey of January, 2002. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
/-> 
L. Rich Humonervsv > p ry y 
Charles M. Lyons * 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Lora Green 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE FARM MUTUAL ] 





LORA GREEN and MARLENE ] 
MURRAY, ; 
Defendants. ] 
i ORDER ON DEFENDANT LORA 
> GREEN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
> JUDGMENT 
i Case No. 96-0400447 
I Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant Lora Green's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Court having reviewed the Memorandum in Support in Opposition of the 
Motion and having determined the general and material facts, now makes and enters the 
following: 
ORDER 
Defendant Lora Green's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. 
FILED 
Fourth Jud.c.al D.stnct Court 
of Utah County, State ot Utah 
1433 
DATED this l& day of NoveTffl5e*r, 1999. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
<icn Numphery^ 
CHRISTENSEN & JEf 




Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County. State of Utah 
— Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State Farm Mutual Automobile : 
Insurance Company, 
Plaintiff : Order Granting Plaintiff s Motion 
For Summary Judgment 
vs. : Date: March 5,2001 
Lora Green and Marlene Murray, : Case Number: 960400447 
Defendant Division V: Judge James R. Taylor 
Plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, filed this action seeking a 
declaration that defendant Lora Green was not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under 
her Utah policies with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company on the grounds that 
she violated the policies when she settled all claims against Marlene Murray, Green's mother, and 
executed a complete release of Murray without the prior written consent of State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company. 
Plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, filed a motion for summary 
judgment in May of 1999. The matter was fully briefed, Defendant Lora Green, filed a motion to 
allow additional discovery before State Farm's summary judgment was ruled upon pursuant to 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court granted Green's motion for 
additional discovery under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and denied Plaintiffs 
motion for summary judgment with the understanding that the motion could be renewed at the 
end of the additional discovery. The Court at that time specifically found that the "consent to 
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settle" clause was valid and directed the defendant to conduct additional discovery from 
employees of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company as to whether a settlement 
limits offer from Marlene Murray's insurance carrier (Horace Mann) had been communicated to 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm had been allowed an 
opportunity to give or deny consent. 
Thereafter, extensive discovery was undertaken by counsel for Green. At the conclusion 
of that extensive discovery, Plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
renewed its motion for summary judgment. After the matter was fully briefed, the motion again 
came on for hearing on November 16, 2000. At that hearing, defendant again requested 
additional discovery and specifically requested discovery from Joann Hirase and attorney Phil Ivie, 
who were the adjuster and the attorney defending Lloyd Louder in a lawsuit filed against him and 
Marlene Murray by Lora Green. At that hearing, David Mortensen, counsel for Louder, appeared 
arguing that the file was protected and privileged but represented as an officer of the Court that 
there was nothing in the file to indicate that Marlene Murray's policy limits settlement offer had 
been communicated to anyone handling the Louder file. Louder's counsel displayed what he 
considered to be relevant portions of the file to the Court. The Court reviewed those portions of 
the file in camera (with the understanding that no privileges on behalf of Mr. Louder would be 
waived), which file included the log notes of Joann Hirase which the Court indicated showed no 
notice to State Farm that an offer of policy limits had been made by Murray to Green. The Court 
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further indicated that it wanted to give Green every opportunity to come up with some evidence 
that the policy limit offer by Marlene Murray had been communicated to State Farm prior to the 
time the settlement occurred. Therefore, another hearing was scheduled for November 28, 2000 
and counsel for Green was allowed in open Court to inquire of Joann Hirase and attorney Phil Ivie 
whether Murray's policy limit demand was ever communicated to them prior to the time that 
Green settled with Murray. 
The third hearing was held on November 28, 2000. Attorney Phil Ivie appeared and 
testified that Murray's settlement limits offer had never been communicated to him prior to the 
time Green settled with Murray. Joann Hirase also appeared and testified that the policy limits 
offer had never been communicated to her prior to the time that Green settled with Murray. 
Thereafter, the Court took the matter under advisement and thereafter, issued its minute 
entry decision. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court having reviewed the pleadings and having heard the 
argument of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, ORDERS that the motion of plaintiff, 
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, for summary judgment is hereby granted. Specifically, 
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the Court rules as follows: 
1. That the Utah insurance policies of Lora Green clearly provided a "consent to 
settle" provision which reads as follows: 
There is no coverage: 
1. For any insured who, without our written consent, settles with any 
person or organization who may be liable for the bodily injury and 
thereby impairs our right to recover our payments; 
2. That there are no genuine issues of fact as to Lora Green's breach of the above 
described "consent to settle" provision and State Farm is therefore entitled to 
Summary Judgment. 
3. That the above referenced "consent to settle provision" is valid; 
4. That the above referenced "consent to settle" provision required Lora Green to 
obtain written consent from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
before settling with Marlene Murray; 
5. That Lora Green violated the above reference "consent to settle" provision of her 
policy by releasing Marlene Murray from all liability without the written consent of 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Marlene Murray is the 
mother of Lora Green; 
6. That the actions of Lora Green in breaching the above referenced "consent to 
settle" provision impaired the rights of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
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Company to collect any payments from Marlene Murray that it may make to Lora 
Green for underinsured motorist benefits; 
That because of Lora Green's breach of agreement, Lora Green is not entitled to 
undersinsured motorist benefits under the Utah policies based on Mrs. Murray's 
underinsurance. 
The Court has previously ruled in favor of Marlene Murray that the release 
completely terminates her liability and potential liability to State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company; 
That plaintiffs claims to declare Murray soley at fault are moot as to the Utah 
policies based on the Courts ruling; 
That since the filing of the complaint plaintiffs claim to declare Louder as not 
being underinsured has been resolved by a jury verdict and judgment against Lora 
Green in Lora Green v. Llovd Louder, et al Case No. 950400617, in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah; however, such verdict and 
judgment is on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. For the purposes of this case 
and this ruling, the judgment rendered on the jury verdict in that case is considered 
final unless and until overturned by an appellate decision. 
This order is, therefore, intended to be a final order disposing of the entire case 
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and judgment in favor of Plaintiff is hereby entered. 
Dated this 5th day of March, 2001 
Taylor 
District Court 
Copies of this Order mailed to: 
Counsel for the Plaintiff: 
Richard K. Glauser 
Albert W. Gray 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Counsel for the Defendant: 
L. Rich Humpherys 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Mailed this *J day of / lQJ^L^2tiO\, postage pre-paid as noted above. 
Page 6 of 6 
28 
Tab 3 
SECTION ffl - UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE U AND 
UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE W 
UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE U 
You have this coverage if "IT appears in the "Coverages" 
space on the declarations page. 
We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legaD> 
entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured 
motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused by accident 
arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an 
uninsured motor vehicle. 
Uninsured Motor Vehicle - means: 
1. a land motor vehicle, the ownership, maintenance 
or use of which is: 
a. not insured or bonded for bodily injury liability 
at the time of the accident; or 
b. insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at 
the time of the accident; but 
(1) the limits of liability are less than requiifd 
by the financial responsibility act of 9ie 
state where your car is mainly garaged; or 
(2) the insuring company denies coverage or 
is or becomes insolvent; or 
2. an unidentified "hit-and-run" land motor vehicle 
which was the proximate cause of the bodily injury. 
The insured must show the existence of the other 
motor vehicle by clear and convincing evidence, 
which shall consist of more than the insured's 
testimony. 
» 
An uninsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor 
vehicle: l 
1. insured under the liability coverage of this policy; • 
2. furnished for the regular use of you, your spouse or 
any relative; 
3. owned or operated by a self-insurer under any 
motor vehicle finanaal responsibility law, a motor 
earner law or any similar law; 
4. owned by any government or any of its political 
subdivisions or agencies; 
5. designed for use mainly off public roads except 
while on public roads; or 
6. while located for use as premises. 
Who Is an Insured 
Insured — means the person or persons covered by 
uninsured motor vehicle coverage. 
This is: 
1. you, your spouse and your relatives; and 
2. any other person while occupying: 
a. your car, a temporary substitute car, a newly 
acquired car or a trailer attached to such car. 
Such vehicle has to be used within the scope of 
the consent of you or your spouse; or 
b a car not owned by you, your spouse or any 
relative, or a trailer attached to such a car. It 
has to be driven by the first person named in 
the declarations or that person's spouse and 
within the scope of the owner's consent 
Such other person occupying a vehicle used to cany 
persons for a charge is not an insured. 
3. any person entitled to recover damages because of 
bodily injury to an insured under 1. and 2. above. 
Deciding Fault and Amount 
Two questions must be decided by agreement between the 
insured anAvs: 
1. Is the insured legally entided to collect damages 
from the owner or driver of the uninsured motor 
vehicle; and 
2. If so, in what amount? 
If there is no agreement, these questions will be decided by 
arbitration upon written request of the insured. Each party 
shall select a competent and impartial arbitrator. These two 
shall select a third one. If unable to agree on the third one 
within 30 days either party may request a judge of a court 
of record in the county in which the arbitration is pending 
to select a third one. The written deasion of any two 
arbitrators shall be binding on each party. 
The cost of the arbitrator and any expert witness shall be 
paid by the party who hired them. The cost of the third 
arbitrator and other expenses of arbitration shall be shared 
equally by both parties. 
The arbitration shall take place in the county in which the 
insured resides unless the parties agree to another place. 
State court rules governing procedure and admission of 
evidence shall be used. 
We are not bound by any judgment against any person or 
organization obtained without our written consent. 
UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
COVERAGE W 
You have this coverage if '* W" appears in the "Coverages" 
space on the declarations page. 
We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally 
entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an 
underinsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused 
by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use 




1. THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF ALL BODILY 
INJURY LIABILITY BONDS AND POLICIES 
THAT APPLY HAVE BEEN USED UP BY 
PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR 
SETTLEMENTS TO OTHER PERSONS; OR 
2. SUCH LIMITS OF LIABILITY OR REMAINING 
PART OF THEM HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO 
THE INSURED. 
Underinsured Motor Vehicle - means a land motor vehicle 
1. the ownership, maintenance or use of which is insured 
or bonded for bodily injury liability at the time of the 
accident; and 
2. whose limits of liability for bodily injury liability: 
a. are less than the amount of the insured's damages, 
or 
b. have been reduced by payments to persons other 
than the insured to less than the amount of the 
insured's damages. 
An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor 
vehicle: 
1. insured under the liability coverage of this policy; 
2. furnished for the regular use of you, your spouse or any 
relative; 
3. owned by any government or any of its political 
subdivisions or agencies; 
4. designed for use mainly off public roads except while 
on public roads; 
5. Awhile located for use as premises; or 
6. defined as an "uninsured motor vehicle" in your policy. 
Who Is an Insured 
Insured — means the person or persons covered by 
underinsured motor vehicle coverage: 
This is: 
L The first person named in the declarations; 
2. his or her spouse; 
3. their relatives; and 
4. any other person while occupying; 
a. your car, a temporary substitute car, a newly 
acquired car, or a trailer attached to such car. 
Such vehicle has to be used within the scope of 
the consent of you or your spouse; or 
b. a car not owned by you, your spouse or any 
relative, or a trailer attached to such a car. It 
has to be driven by the first person named in 
the declarations or that person's spouse and 
within the scope of the owner's consent 
persons for a charge is not an insured 
5 any person entitled to recover damages because of 
bodily injury to an insured under 1 through 4 above 
Deciding Fault and Amount 
Two questions must be decided by agreement between the 
insured and us* 
1 Is the insured legally entided to collect damages 
from the owner or driver of the underinsured motor 
vehicle; and 
2. If so, in what amount? 
If there is no agreement, these questions shall be decided by 
arbitration upon written request of the insured or us. 
Each party shall select a competent and impartial arbitrator. 
These two shall select a third one. If unable to agree on the 
third one within 30 days either party may request a judge of 
a court of record in the county in which the arbitration is 
pending to select a third one. The written decision of any 
two arbitrators shall be binding on each party. 
The cost of the arbitrator and any expert witness shall be 
paid by the party who hired them. The cost of the third 
arbitrator and other expenses of arbitration shall be shared 
equally by both parties. 
The arbitration shall take place in the county in which the 
iAsured resides unless the parties agree to another place. 
Sfete court rules governing procedure and admission of 
evidence shall be used, 
c 
We are not bound by any judgment against any person or 
organization obtained without our written consent 
Payment of Any Amount Due — Coverages U and W 
We will pay any amount due: 
1. to the insured; 
2. to a parent or guardian if the insured is a minor or 
an incompetent person; 
3. to the surviving spouse; or 
4. at our option, to a person authorized by law to 
receive such payment 
Limits of Liability - Coverage U 
1. The amount of coverage is shown on the declarations 
page under "Limits of Liability - U - Each Person, 
Each Accident". Under "Each Person" is the amount 
of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one 
person. "RodUy injury to one person" includes all injury 
and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury. 
Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of 
coverage, subject to the amount shown under "Each 
Person", for ail damages due to bodily injury to two or 
more persons in the same accident 
1 
2 Any amount payable under this coverage shall be 
reduced by any amount paid or payable to or for the 
insured: 
a. by or for any person or organization who is or may 
be held legally liable for the bodily injury to the 
insured; or 
b. for bodily injury under the liability coverage 
3. Any payment made to a person under this coverage 
shall reduce any amount payable to that person under 
the bodily injury liability coverage 
4. Any amount paid or payable under 
a. the no-fault coverage; or 
b. any worker's compensation, disability benefits, or 
similar law 
will not be paid for again as damages under this 
coverage. This does not reduce the limits of liability of 
this coverage. 
5. The limits of liability are not increased because 
a. more than one vehicle is insured under this policy; 
or 
b. more than one person is insured at the time of the 
accident 
Limits of Liability — Coverage W 
1. The amount of coverage is shown on the declarations 
page under "Limits of Liability - W - Each Person, 
Each Accident". Under "Each Person" is the amount 
of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to onp 
person. Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of 
coverage, subject to the amount shown under "Eacfi 
Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or 
more persons in the same accident. 
2. Any amount paid or payable under 
a. the no-fault coverage; or 
b. any worker's compensation, disability benefits or 
similar law 
will not be paid for again as damages under this 
coverage. This does not reduce the limits of liability of 
this coverage 
3. Any payment made to a person under this coverage 
shall reduce any amount payable to that person for 
bodily injury under the liability coverage. 
4. The limits of liability are not increased because. 
a. more than one vehicle is insured under this policy; 
b. more than one person is insured at the time of the 
accident; or 
c. more than one underinsured motor vehicle is 
involved in the same accident. 
5. The most we pay will be the lesser of. 
a. the difference between the amount of the insured's 
damages for bodily injury, and the amount paid to 
the insured by or for any person or organization 
who is or may be held legally liable for the bodily 
injury; or 
b the limits of liability of this coverage 
When Coverage U Does Not Apply 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE 
1 FOR ANY INSURED WHO, WITHOUT OUR 
WRITTEN CONSENT, SETTLES WITH ANY 
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE 
LIABLE FOR THE BODIL Y INJUR Y. 
2 FOR BODILY INJURYTO AN INSURED: 
a WHILE OCCUPYING, OR 
b THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY 
A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR 
SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT 
INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE UNDER THIS 
POLICY. 
3. TO THE EXTENT IT BENEFITS. 
a. ANY WORKER'S COMPENSATION OR 
DISABILITY BENEFITS INSURANCE 
COMPANY. 
b. A SELF-INSURER UNDER ANY 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION, OR 
DISABILITY BENEFITS OR SIMILAR LAW. 
c. ANY GOVERNMENTAL BODY OR 
AGENCY. 
When Coverage W Does Not Apply 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE: 
1. 
2. 
FOR ANY INSURED WHO, WITHOUT OUR 
WRITTEN CONSENT, SETTLES WITH ANY 
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE 
LIABLE FOR THE BODILY INJURY AND 
THEREBY IMPAIRS OUR RIGHT TO RECOVER 
OUR PAYMENTS. 
FOR BODILYINJURYTO ANY INSURED: 
a. WHILE OCCUPYING, OR 
b. THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY 
A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR 
SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT 
INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE UNDER THIS 
POLICY. 
TO THE EXTENT IT BENEFITS: 
a. ANY WORKER'S COMPENSATION OR 
DISABILITY BENEFITS INSURANCE 
COMPANY. 
b. A SELF-INSURER UNDER ANY 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION, OR 
DISABILITY BENEFITS OR SIMILAR LAW. 




4. FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES OR INTEREST 
AWARDED TO OR CLAIMED BY THE 
INSURED. 
5. FOR ANY PERSON WHOSE CLAIM FOR 
BODILY INJURY ARISES OUT OF BODILY 
/A7£//?FSUSTAINED BY ANOTHER PERSON 
6. FOR COSTS OR ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED 
BY, ON BEHALF OF, OR AWARDED TO THE 
INSURED. 
If There Is Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage 
1. Regardless of the number of motor vehicles involved, 
the number of persons covered Or claims made, vehicles 
or premiums shown in the policy or premiums paid, the 
limit of liability for uninsured motor vehicle coverage 
shall not be added to or stacked upon limits for such 
coverage applying to other motor vehicles to determine 
the amount of coverage available to an insured injured 
in any one accident. 
2. If the insured sustains bodily injury and other uninsured 
motor vehicle coverage applies: 
a. the insured must elect one policy under which to 
make a claim; and 
b. COVERAGE UNDER THIS POLICY DOES 
NOT APPLY IF THE INSURED ELECTS ANY 
OTHER UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
COVERAGE UNDER WHICH TO MAKE A 
CLAIM. 
3. TTHS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF THERE 
IS OTHER UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
COVERAGE ON A NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR. 
If There Is Other Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage 
1. If the insured sustains bodily i^wy as a pedestrian and 
other underinsured motor vehicle coverage applies: 
a. the total limits of liability under all such coverages 
shall not exceed that of the coverage with the 
highest limit of liability; and 
b we are liable only for our share. Our share is that 
per cent of the damages that the limit of liability of 
this coverage bears to the total of all undennsured 
motor vehicle coverage applicable to the accident. 
2 If the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying your 
car, and your car is described on the declarations page 
of another policy providing underinsured motor vehicle 
coverage: 
a. the total limits of liability under all such coverages 
shall not exceed that of the coverage with the 
highest limit of liability; and 
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is that 
per cent of the damages that the limit of liability of 
this coverage bears to the total of all such 
underinsured motor vehicle coverage applicable to 
the accident 
3 If the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying a 
vehicle not owned by you, your spouse or any relative, 
this coverage applies: 
a. as excess to any underinsured motor vehicle 
coverage which applies to the vehicle as primary 
coverage, but 
b. only in the amount by which it exceeds the primary 
coverage. 
If coverage under more than one policy applies as 
excess: 
a. the total limit of liability shall not exceed-the 
difference between the limit of liability of the 
coverage that applies as primary and the highest 
limit of liability of any one of die coverages that 
apply as excess; and 
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is that 
per cent of the damages that the limit of liability of 
this coverage bears to the total of all underinsured 
motor vehicle coverage applicable as excess to the 
accident. 
4 THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF THERE 
IS OTHER UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 




31A-22-302. Required components of motor vehicle in-
surance policies — Exceptions. 
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies 
purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security require-
ment of Section 41-12a-301 shall include: 
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections 31A-
22-303 and 31A-22-304; 
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-
305, unless affirmatively waived under Subsection 31A-
22-305(4); and 
(c) underinsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-
22-305, unless affirmatively waived under Subsection 
31A-22-305(8)(c). 
(2) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies, 
purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security require-
ment of Section 41-12a-301, except for motorcycles, trailers, 
and semitrailers, shall also include personal injury protection 
under Sections 31A-22-306 thrpugh 31A-22-309. 
(3) First party medical coverages may be offered or included 
in policies issued to motorcycle, trailer, and semitrailer owners 
or operators. Owners and operators of motorcycles, trailers, 
and semitrailers are not covered by personal iryury protection 
coverages in connection with injuries incurred while operating 
any of these vehicles. 1992 
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31A-22-S05. Uninsured and underinsured motorist 
coverage. 
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes: 
(a) the named insured; 
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, 
marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who are residents of 
the named insured's household, including those who usu-
ally make their home tin the same household but tempo-
rarily live elsewhere; 
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle 
referred to in the policy or owned by a self-insurer; and 
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages 
against the owner or operator of the uninsured or 
underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury to or 
death of persons under Subsection (lXa), (b), or (c).' 
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" in-
cludes: 
(a) (i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of 
which is not covered under a liability policy at the 
time of an iiyuiy-causing occurrence; or 
(ii) (A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits 
than required by Section 31A-22-304; 
(B) the vehicle described in Subsection 
(2XaXiiXA) is uninsured to the extent of the 
deficiency; 
(b) an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an 
accident proximately caused by the vehicle operator; or 
(c) (i) an insured vehicle if, before or after the accident, 
the liability insurer of the vehicle is declared insol-
vent by a court of competent jurisdiction; 
(ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2XcXi) is 
uninsured only to the extent that the claim against 
the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty 
association or fund. 
(3) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-
302(lXb) provides coverage for covered persons who are le-
gally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, 
disease, or death in limits that at least equal the minimum 
bodily injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under 
Section 31A-22-304. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4Xb), the named 
insured may reject uninsured motorist coverage by an 
express writing to the insurer that provides liability 
coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(lXa). This rejec-
tion continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until 
the insured in writing requests uninsured motorist cover-
age from that liability insurer. 
(b) All persons, including governmental entities, that 
are engaged in the business of, or that accept payment for, 
transporting natural persons by motor vehicle, and all 
school districts that provide transportation services for 
their students, shall provide coverage for all vehicles used 
for that purpose, by purchase of a policy of insurance or by 
self-insurance, uninsured motorist coverage of at least 
$25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. 
(i) This coverage is secondary to any other insur-
ance covering an injured covered person. 
(ii) This coverage does not apply to an employee, 
who is injured by an uninsured motorist, whose 
exclusive remedy is provided by Title 35, Chapter 1, 
Workers' Compensation, 
(c) As used in this subsection: 
(i) "Governmental entity* has the same meaning 
as under Section 63-30-2. 
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under 
Section 41-la-102. 
(5) When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor 
vehicle under Subsection (2Kb) proximately caused an acci-
dent without touching the covered person or the vehicle 
occupied by the covered person, the covered person must show 
the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and 
convincing evidence consisting of more than the covered 
person's testimony. 
(6) (a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage 
for two or more motor vehicles may not be added together, 
combined, or stacked to determine the limit of insurance 
coverage available to an injured person for any one 
accident. 
(b) (i) Subsection (a) applies to all persons except a 
covered person as defined under Subsection (7XbXii). 
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection 
(7XbXii) is entitled to the highest limits of uninsured 
motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle that 
the covered person is the named insured or an in-
sured family member. 
(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the cov-
erage on the vehicle the covered person is occupying. 
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary cover-
age may be set off against the other. 
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of 
an accident shall be primary coverage, and the coverage 
elected by a person described under Subsections (lXa) and 
(b) shall be secondary coverage. 
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section ap-
plies to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death of covered 
persons while occupying or using a motor vehicle only if 
the motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a 
claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired 
or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the 
policy. Except as provided in Subsection (6) or (7), a 
covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy 
that includes uninsured motorist benefits may not elect to 
collect uninsured motorist coverage benefits from any 
other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a 
covered person. 
(b) Each of the following persons may also recover 
uninsured motorist benefits under any other policy in 
which they are described as a "covered person9 as defined 
in Subsection (1): 
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an 
uninsured motor vehicle; and 
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or 
using a motor vehicle that is not owned by furnished, 
or available for the regular use of the covered person, 
the covered person's resident spouse, or the covered 
person's resident relative. 
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7Xb) is not barred 
against making subsequent elections if recovery is un-
available under previous elections. 
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor ve-
hicle" includes a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or 
use of which is covered under a liability policy at the time 
of an iiyury-causing occurrence, but which has insuffi-
cient liability coverage to compensate fully the iryured 
party for all special and general damages. 
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not 
include: 
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liabil-
ity coverage of the same policy that also contains the 
underinsured motorist coverage; or 
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Sub-
section (2). 
(9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 
31A-22-302(lXc) provides coverage for covered persons 
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners 
or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of 
bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death in limits of at 
least $10,000 for one person in any one accident, and at 
least $20,000 for two or more persons in any one accident. 
(b) The named insured's underinsured motorist cover-
age, as described in Subsection (9Xa), is secondary to the 
liability coverage of an owner or operator of an 
underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection 
(8). Underinsured motorist coverage may not be set off 
against the liability coverage of the owner or operator of 
an underinsured motor vehicle, but shall be added to, 
combined with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of 
the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle 
to determine the limit of coverage available to the injured 
person. 
(c) (i) For new policies or contracts written after Janu-
ary 1, 1993, a named insured may reject 
underinsured motorist coverage by an express writ-
ing to the insurer that provides liability coverage 
under Subsection 31A-22-302 (lXa). This rejection 
continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until 
the insured in writing requests underinsured motor-
ist coverage from that liability insurer. 
(ii) In conjunction with the first three renewal 
notices sent after January 1,1993, for policies exist-
ing on that date, the insurer shall notify the insured 
of the availability of underinsured motorist coverage 
along with estimated ranges of premiums for the 
coverage. The department shall provide standard 
language to be used by insurers to fidfill the insurers' 
duty under this subsection. 
(10) (a) Underinsiired motorist coverage under this section 
applies to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death of an 
insured while occupying or using a motor vehicle owned , 
by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the 
insured, a resident spouse, or resident relative of the 
insured, only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy 
under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a 
newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the 
terms of the policy. Except as provided in Subsection (10), 
a covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy 
that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not 
elect to collect underinsured motorist coverage benefits 
from any other motor vehicle insurance policy under 
which he is a named insured. 
(b) (i) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist 
coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be 
added together, combined, or stacked to determine 
the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured 
person for any one accident. 
(ii) Subsection, (bXi) applies to all persons except a 
covered person as defined under Subsection (cXiXB). 
(iii) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the 
time of an accident shall be primary coverage, and 
the coverage elected by a person described under 
Subsections dXa) and (b) shall be secondary cover-
age, 
(c) (i) Each of the following persons may also recover 
underinsured motorist coverage benefits under any 
other policy in which they are described as a "covered 
person" as defined under Subsection (1): 
(A) a covered person injured as a pedestrian 
by an underinsured motor vehicle; or 
(B) a covered person iiyured while occupying 
or using a motor vehicle that is not owned by, 
furnished, or available for the regular use of the 
covered person, the covered person's resident 
spouse, or the covered person's resident relative. 
(ii) This coverage shall only be available as a 
secondary source of coverage. 
(iii) A covered person as defined under Subsection 
(c)(iXB) is entitled to the highest limits of 
underinsured motorist coverage afforded for any one 
vehicle that the covered person is the named insured 
or an insured family member. 
(iv) This coverage shall be in addition to the cov-
erage on the vehicle the covered person is occupying. 
(v) Neither the primary nor the secondary cover-
age may be set off against the other. 
(d) A covered injured person is not barred against 
making subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable 
under nrevious elections. Idas 
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CONDITIONS 
1. Policy Changes 3. 
a. Policy Terms The terms of this policy may be 
changed or waived only by* 
(1) an endorsement signed by one of our executive 
officers; or 
(2) the revision of this policy form to give broader 
coverage without an extra charge. If any 
coverage you carry is changed to give broader 
coverage, we will give you the broader coverage 
without the issuance of a new policy as of the 
date we make the change effective. 
b. Change of Interest. No change of interest in this 
policy is effective unless *e consent in writing 
However, if you die, we will protect as named 
insured, except under death, dismemberment and 
loss of sight coverage: 
(1) your surviving spouse; 
(2) any person with proper custody of your car, a 
newly acquired car or a temporary substitute car 
until a legal representative is qualified; and then 
(3) the legal representative while acting within the 
scope of his or her duties. 
Policy notice requirements are met by mailing the 
notice to the deceased named insured's last known 
address. 
c. Consent of Beneficiary. Consent of the bejiefteiary 
under death, dismemberment and loss of sight 
coverage is not needed to cancel or change the 
policy. 
d. Joint and Individual Interests. When there,are two 
or more named insureds, each acts for all to cancel 
or change the policy. 
2. Suit Against Us 
There is no right of action against us: 
a. until aD the terms of this policy have been met; and 
b. under the liability coverage, until the amount of 
damages an insured is legally liable to pay has been 
finally determined by: 
(1) judgment after actual trial, and appeal if any; 
or 
(2) agreement between the insured, the claimant 
and us. 4 
Bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or his or 
her estate shall not relieve us of our obligations. 
c. under all other coverages until the earlier of: 
(1) 60 days after we receive proof of loss; 
(2) our waiver of proof of loss; or 
(3) our denial of full payment. 
21 
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Our Right to Recover Our Payments 
a Death, dismemberment and loss of sight coverage 
payments are not recoverable by us. 
b Under uninsured motor vehicle coverage: 
(1) we are subrogated to the extent of our 
payments to the proceeds of any settlement the 
injured person recovers from any party bable 
for the bodily injury. 
(2) if the person to or for whom we have made 
payment has not recovered from the party at 
fault, he or she shall: 
(a) keep these rights in trust for us; 
(b) execute any legal papers we need; and 
(c) when we ask, take action through our 
representative to recover our payments. 
We are to be repaid our payments, costs and 
fees of collection out of any recovery. 
c. Under no-fault coverage we are entitled to recover 
our payments in accord with Utah law. 
d. Under underinsured motor vehicle coverage: 
(1) we are entitled, to the extent of our payments, 
to the proceeds of any setdement the insured 
recovers from any party liable for the bodily 
injury, other than payments from bodily injury 
liability bonds or policies made prior to our 
payment. 
(2) if the insured has not been fully compensated 
for the bodily injury by the party at fault and 
we make payment for the bodily injury, the 
insured shall: 
(a) keep these rights in trust for us: 
(b) execute any legal papers we need; and 
(c) when we ask, take action through our 
representative to recover the amount of 
our payments. 
We are to be repaid our payments, costs and 
fees of collection out of any such recovery 
e. Under all other coverages the right of recovery of 
any party we pay passes to us. Such party shall. 
(1) not hurt our rights to recover, and 
(2) help us get our money back. 
Cancellation 
How You May Cancel. You may cancel your policy by 
notifying us in writing of the date to cancel, which must 
be later than the date you mail or deliver it to us. We 
may waive these requirements by confirming the date 
and time of cancellation to you in writing. 
How and When We May Cancel. We may cancel your 
policy by written notice, mailed to your last known 
